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Abstract
Using an original database of over 3,000 micro and small enterprises (MSEs) that were mi-
crofinance institution (MFI) clients in Madagascar over the period of 2008-2014, we observe
that around one third of these entrepreneurs switched business sectors in the first five years
after starting their business. We find that the probability of an entrepreneur’s changing sectors
is highly correlated with the size of the first loan obtained from the MFI. This result survives
multiple robustness checks, including treatment for endogeneity and attrition. We interpret
this finding in terms of financial constraint: a lack of financing prevents an entrepreneur from
initially investing in his first choice sector, causing him to change sectors only when he has
become financially able to do so. This result challenges the classic distinction made between
”necessity entrepreneurs” and ”opportunity entrepreneurs” and raises important questions con-
cerning entrepreneurial talent allocation.
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, Financial constraint, firm dynamics, Madagascar
JEL classification: L26, M13, O16, O55
∗E-mail addresses: pierrick.baraton@etu.udamail.fr (P. Baraton); florian.leon@uni.lu (F. Le´on)
We would like to thank Simone Bertoli, Vianney Dequiedt and Ababacar Gueye as well as participants
of the CERDI internal doctoral seminar (Clermont-Ferrand, September 2015), the CSAE Conference
(Oxford, March 2016) and the JMA Conference (June 2016) for their useful comments. The usual
disclaimers apply.
1
1 Introduction
In this paper, we attempt to look at entrepreneurship in relation to an important and
rarely scrutinized aspect of firm dynamics in developing countries: that of migration
across sectors. Contrary to common beliefs, entrepreneurs in developing countries often
develop different activities sequentially (Newman et al., 2013). Our data indicate that
five years after the creation of their firm, one third of entrepreneurs no longer operated
in the same business sector. A large literature has investigated the determinants of en-
trepreneurship and firms’ growth but very little is known about sectorial migrations.
Many factors may explain such migration across sectors. For instance, one explanation
is that economic conditions may make one sector suddenly more appealing than another.
A second explanation is that the entrepreneur was not operating in their desired sector
from the start. The first explanation involves ”serial entrepreneurs” who are defined as
highly skill entrepreneurs who launch businesses successively if the quality of the business
they currently practice is below a certain threshold (Plehn-Dujowich, 2010). The second
explanation involves entrepreneurs who may start their initial business in a sector which
does not suit them due to ”entry mistakes” (Cabral, 1997) or ”overconfidence” in their
capacity to perform (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999).
In this article, we suggest that the extend of financial constraints faced by an entrepreneur
can be an important determinant. Some financially constrained entrepreneurs may launch
a business in a sector other than that of their first choice due to high entry costs in their
preferred sector. As they earn more money and financial constraints relax, they may
shut down their initial business to launch a new business in another sector better suited
to their needs. We investigate whether financial constraints affect a given entrepreneur’s
probability of changing business sectors in Madagascar. Madagascar provides an excellent
testing ground given that the functioning of capital market is limited by the existence
of significant failures. We use an original database of small business clients of a micro-
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finance institution (MFI). We gather information on 3,017 firms who created businesses
between 2008 and 2010 and obtained loans from one MFI. Among these entrepreneurs,
one third (921 out of 3,017) had changed business sectors by 2014. The first loan amount
obtained from the MFI is used as a proxy to assess the degree of individual access to
finance. Our results show that less financially constrained firms (that is entrepreneurs
who obtain a larger first loan) had fewer incentives to change business sectors. Increasing
the loan amount borrowed by one standard deviation decreases by two percentage points
the probability of the entrepreneur changing sectors, all else being equal. Our results
survive different robustness checks, including treatment for endogeneity, attrition and
sample change.
This paper contributes to the literature dealing with the dynamics of small firms and en-
trepreneurship in developing countries. Some papers have investigated the determinants
of firm creation, growth and death in developing countries (e.g. Mead and Liedholm,
1998; Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys, 2002; Harding et al., 2006; Nichter and Goldmark,
2009; Hsieh and Klenow, 2014, among others), however, as far as we know, only Newman
et al. (2013) have investigated sectoral migrations in developing countries.1 Using data
from Vietnamese manufacturing firms, they show that between 6 to 35 percent of firms
switched industry between 2001 and 2008. Our paper complements this previous work
in two dimensions. First, we study sectoral migration for microenterprises, while New-
man et al. (2013) concentrate on large, formal and manufacturing enterprises. In this
work, we focus on small firms operating in agriculture, industry, trade and services. Our
data confirm that this phenomenon is far from anecdotal among microenterprises and
therefore deserves some attention. Second, our paper differs from Newman et al. (2013)
in its objective. They investigate differences in terms of productivity or capital-labor
ratio between switching firms and their counterparts. Our data do not allow us to do so.
However, we focus on one possible explanation of migrations across sectors. Specifically,
1Bernard et al. (2006) scrutinize this phenomenon in the U.S. and they find that eight percent of
manufacturing firms switched activities during five-years periods between 1977 and 1997.
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we study whether sectoral migrations are induced by initial financial constraints faced
by an entrepreneur. We argue that financial constraint can have an entrepreneur may
choose an activity sector by default rather than by mistake because of limited investment
capacity.
This paper also adds elements to a burgeoning body of literature that investigates the
relationships between business owner’s entrepreneurial motivation and economic devel-
opment. Researchers have mainly focused on the distinction between ”opportunity en-
trepreneurs” who strive to grow wealth by developing new ventures in economically ap-
pealing sectors and ”necessity entrepreneurs” who, by contrast, start a business because
they have no better option for work (Reynolds et al., 2002). This distinction is quite
interesting since it suggests that, depending on their initial motivation, entrepreneurs
may not make the same contribution to economic growth. Opportunity entrepreneurs
are Schumpeterian entrepreneurs who fuel structural transformation through the well-
known destructive-creation process, while necessity entrepreneurs display much lower
entrepreneurial talent and are likely to run into early failures and thus may contribute to
precarious and temporary job creation (Acs, 2006; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007; Quatraro
and Vivarelli, 2015). The difference between necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs
may not be so distinct since we do not know precisely why necessity entrepreneurs
start their businesses. Previous studies make the implicit assumption that necessity en-
trepreneurs become entrepreneurs by default (i.e., out of sheer necessity) and implicitly
assume that these entrepreneurs do not have any particular entrepreneurial motivation
or talent (Reynolds et al., 2002; Hessels et al., 2008). In this article, we argue that the
migrating entrepreneurs we observe can be considered both as necessity entrepreneurs
and as opportunity-driven entrepreneurs. We believe that initially they choose to start
a business (like an opportunity entrepreneur) but that a lack of capital prevents them
from investing in their first-choice sector. A lack of paid-job opportunities actually in-
duces them to start a business (like a necessity entrepreneur) in a second choice sector.
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However, these entrepreneurs are not necessarily reluctant to become entrepreneurs or
devoid of entrepreneurial talent. As far as we know, our article is the first to illustrate
that because of credit market and labor market failures, certain ”would-be” opportunity
entrepreneurs may have no other choice than to invest in a sector which may not be
the most appropriate for them. Insofar as a misallocation of entrepreneurial talent is
detrimental for growth and development (Bianchi, 2010; Gries and Naude´, 2010), and
considering the important share of migrating entrepreneurs in our sample (more than one
third) this is an important issue.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes to what level financ-
ing constraint and sectorial entry costs may drive an entrepreneur’s business decisions.
Section 3 presents our data, variables and method while Section 4 displays our economet-
ric results. The final section concludes.
2 Conceptual framework
This paper refers to the abundant literature on ”self employment”, and especially to
the relationship between financial constraint and entrepreneurship. According to this
literature, individuals have basically two occupational choices : get a job or start a
business. This decision depends on a tradeoff between the expected utility of the two
situations which depends mainly on expected earnings.2 Several authors have argued
that low wage and widespread unemployment may be important push factors for an
individual’s switch from paid employment to entrepreneurship (Evans and Leighton, 1990;
Storey, 1991; Foti and Vivarelli, 1994).
A large body of research has also highlighted the role of financial constraint to explain
2Beyond these financial aspects, particular attention has been given to how personal characteristics
may influence the choice of entering into entrepreneurship, such as age (Blanchflower, 2000), the role of
family background (Burke et al., 2008), the level of education (Blanchflower and Meyer, 1994) or even
psychological attributes such as the need for autonomy (Brandsta¨tter, 1997), the internal locus of control
(Brandsta¨tter, 1997) and the lack of risk aversion (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979)
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an individual’s decision (or not) to start a business. In their seminal work, Evans and
Jovanovic (1989) highlight that wealthier people in the United States were more inclined
to become entrepreneurs since their personal wealth allowed them to borrow more capital
on the credit market. These results are consistent with the stylized facts documented
by Evans and Leighton (1989) who find that ”men with greater assets are more likely
to switch to self-employment, all else equal”. Controlling for endogeneity, various works
have confirmed the positive effect of personal wealth in developed countries on a person’s
decision to create a business (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1993).
Concerning developing countries, works are fewer. Focusing on Thailand, Paulson and
Townsend (2004) find that wealthier households are more likely to start businesses and
to invest more starting capital.
Beyond the relationship between wealth and entrepreneurship, several studies have fo-
cused on understanding how an individual’s wealth was likely to influence their invest-
ment choices. Using models of self-employment with liquidity constraint, Zazzaro (2001)
and Bianchi (2010) suggest that potential entrepreneurs may be induced to choose tra-
ditional low return businesses instead of innovative ones because of credit constraint.
Such choices have important consequences on entrepreneur’s wealth. Using data from
Cameroon, Nguimkeu (2014) documents that entrepreneur’s investment choices and en-
trepreneurial earnings are positively related to initial wealth. Interestingly, simulations
show that allowing an individual to borrow up to three times the value of their average
wealth will increase their average earnings by more than 30%. Banerjee et al. (2015)
provide close results. They show that financially constrained entrepreneurs can only ac-
cess diminishing-returns technology while less financially constrained entrepreneurs can
access technologies with higher fixed costs but also with higher returns. Comparing the
impact of different types of credit on households’ investment in Bangladesh, Dalla Pelleg-
rina (2011) find that tight repayment schedules may preclude borrowers from undertaking
long-term investments. According the author, it may push farmers, whose production cy-
cle is longer than in other activities, toward more flexible but sometimes more expensive
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credit channels, such as the informal one. In the same vain, Field et al. (2013) find that
microfinance loans with a two-month grace period encouraged small entrepreneurs (who
were financially constrained by the terms of their standard microfinance loans) to acquire
non liquid assets and enabled them to better optimize their investments.
In this article, we highlight that in addition to being unable to invest in high-return
technologies, individuals face constraints both on the job market and the credit market
to such an extent that they may not be able to create a business in their desired sector,
ultimately leading to the choice of a business sector by default.
To study whether financial constraints affect sectoral migration, we merely extend the
framework developed by Ahlin and Jiang (2008) that documents that some households
may save enough capital to move from self-employment to ”real entrepreneurship”. We
assume that individuals have two occupational choices, employment or business creation.
Each individual compares the gain he or she would obtain from employment to the ex-
pected profit resulting from running a firm. The expected gain of the employee activity
is the average wage times the probability of getting the job while an entrepreneur starts
a business with capital investment and realizes profit. More precisely, we assume that an
entrepreneur can either invest in a business that requires a minimal amount of capital and
entrepreneurial talent or he can invest in another activity requiring less capital but also
less fitted to their entrepreneurial capacities and therefore generating a lower profit. We
call the first activity a ”first choice sector”and the second activity a ”second choice sector”.
Let us consider I˜i as the expected investment for the entrepreneur i and Ai as the en-
trepreneur’s investment capacity. We define I˜i as the minimum investment required to
make the business viable. We assume that entrepreneurs can rely only on their own
wealth to create their first enterprise. Indeed, creating an enterprise is a very risky un-
dertaking (Bartelsman et al., 2005) and because of high asymmetry information and poor
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institutional framework, banks3 in developing countries are reluctant to finance individ-
uals whose entrepreneurial talent has not yet been demonstrated. Therefore, we assume
that Ai is only composed of the entrepreneur’s personal resources.
The financial constraint is defined as I˜i - Ai, that is the difference between what the
potential entrepreneur plans to invest and what he can really invest. The intensity of
the financial constraint depends on Ai but also on I˜i, the minimum capital required to
launch a viable business in a given sector, i.e. entry costs.4 We assume that entry costs
vary significantly depending on the activity sectors. For instance, considering the median
total assets (fixed assets + working capital) of new firms in each sector as a measure of
entry costs, we observe that new firms in the renting/fixing sector have 11 times more
total assets than firms in the food processing sector (see Table A1 in the Appendix for
more details). Therefore, depending on the sector targeted, a potential entrepreneur may
be able to start his activity (or not) for the same amount of money.
Let us consider two sectors. Sector j is the sector initially chosen by the potential en-
trepreneur, and sector m is a sector which requires a lower initial investment. We have
Im < Ij where Im and Ij are the minimum starting capital required to create a viable
business respectively in sector m and j.
If Ai is inferior to Ij but superior to Im the individual cannot start his business in the
sector he wants. He may then choose to get a job. However, we assume that for some
people with a minimum of entrepreneurial talent, or who have difficulty finding a decent
job, due to a high unemployment rate or low wages in the informal sector, we assume that
entrepreneurship expected earnings are always superior to employee’s expected income.
3Commercial banks and microfinance institutions as well.
4For instance, Mead (1994) documented that in Southern and Eastern Africa initial capital require-
ments were inversely related to new business creation. In some sectors, a business has to reach a ”mini-
mum efficiency scale” to be viable and profitable, particularly because some sectors are more affected by
scale economies. In these sectors, smaller firms face proportionally higher fixed costs and are more likely
to be driven out of the market (Lotti and Santarelli, 2004). Finally, in some activities, the production
process takes a long time and therefore requires long term financing.
8
In the case of high constraints on the job market, the individual may have no other choice
than starting a business in sector m.
We argue that these ”constrained entrepreneurs” will try to reach their first choice sec-
tor as soon as they are financially able to, resulting in the ”sectoral migrations”we observe.
To test our hypothesis, we expect that migration is more likely among entrepreneurs
who were financially constrained when they started their enterprise. However, Hurst and
Lusardi (2004) show that financial constraint is not more binding for industries with
high start up costs than for those with low start up costs. We may therefore observe
that financial constraint has no impact on first sector choice and subsequent migrations.
At the opposite, it is worth noting that as migration involves many costs (liquidation
costs, building costs, etc.), we could observe an opposite effect since credit can also be
interpreted as an increasing of financial resources and not only as a proxy of financial
constraint.
3 Data and variables
3.1 Data
We benefited from a comprehensive client database of a microfinance institution (MFI)
in Madagascar. Madagascar provides an excellent testing ground given that the func-
tioning of both labor and capital markets appears to be quite imperfect.5 Our data are
particularly conducive for our research question since they allow us to depict each client’s
sectoral evolution and simultaneously observe their economic situation. Since 2008, the
MFI has been collecting business information (sector, sales, profit, fixed assets, number
5According to the Malagasy National Statistical Institute (NSI), only 6.4% of the working population
currently has a formal job, and the median wage in the informal sector is five times lower than in the
formal sector, $11.5 and $51 per month, respectively. Moreover, only 6% of adults report that they have
an account at a financial institution, compared to 29% on average in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and only
15% of enterprises report having a bank loan/line of credit in 2013, compared to 23% for SSA (Global
Financial Inclusion Database - September 2015)
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of employees, starting date, etc.) and basic information for each loan granted (amount
of loan, duration, interest rate, collateral pledged etc.) for all of its customers. Data
is collected by credit officers for each credit renewal (rather than retrospectively) which
gives us some accuracy assurance.6
While the database includes exhaustive information about all of the entrepreneurs who
received a loan from the MFI between 2008 and 2014, we focus our attention on the
cohort of firms created between 2008 and 2010. Due to a lack of data, we cannot use
firm and credit information before 2008. We choose to work with cohorts because we
are interested by firms’ characteristics, especially the financial constraint, when they are
created. Making a pooling analysis would have lead us to compare all firms regardless
of their starting year and therefore at different stage of their life cycle. Including time
dummies would not have been relevant given that for firms created before 2008 we are
not sure of the data accuracy, especially concerning the sector 7.
We also needed to observe a sufficient number of firms over a sufficient amount of time
to capture sectoral migrations. Considering only firms created in 2008 sharply reduced
our sample. Using a cohort of firms created between 2008 and 2010 allows us to extend
the number of firms. In addition, the lapse between 2010 and 2014 (which is the latest
available year) is sufficient to observe whether entrepreneurs migrated (or not) across
sectors.8 Our final sample includes 3,017 firms, all created in 2008, 2009 or 2010.
Of course, there is no denying that our database has some limitations. First, MSEs we
are studying are MFI clients and therefore present particular characteristics compared
6De Mel et al. (2009) shed an interesting light on the difficulty of accurately assessing the income of
microenterprises with field surveys.
7Before 2008, the partner MFI did not have the same process to collect information concerning the
borrowers
8Additional filter rules are applied in our study. First, we excluded firms that reported business in a
sector entitled ”diverse” because this sector includes unclassified activities. Second, among the remaining
firms, we kept those with at least two observations available between 2008 and 2014 (since we aim at
studying changes in sectors we need to have at least 2 observations). Finally, we dropped firms for which
control variables were not available.
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to other MSEs. Second, even if credit officers have interest to be as accurate as possible
when they collect economic and financial information from clients, this kind of data are
always complicated to assess when concerning micro and small business without accurate
accounting practices. Third, although a given entrepreneur started his business in 2008,
he did not necessarily obtained his first loan from the partner MFI that same year, thus
appearing in our database in 2008. As illustrated by Figure 1, we can broadly identify
three steps in the entrepreneurial process. In step 1, the individual chooses to start a
business instead of trying to get a paid-job (with respect to our assumption of very low
opportunities on the job market in Madagascar). In step 2, he decides what sector he
wants to invest in depending on his investment capacity and the starting capital required.
In step 3, he runs his activity and obtains his first loan from the MFI in step three. It
is from this point that the entrepreneur appears in our database where we can observe
whether of not he changes sectors afterwards.
Figure 1: Timeline illustrating the process of obtaining a loan and changing sector
Thus, we do not know whether borrowers had previously changed business sectors before
obtaining a loan from the MFI. This probability is negatively correlated with the time
between step two and step three. As illustrated in Table A3 in the Appendix, 18% of
our sample is composed of enterpreneurs that obtained their first loan the same year
they created their business; and on average, there are 2.3 years between the creation
of the enterprise and the granting of the first loan. As presented in Figure 1, we have
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information only when entrepreneurs obtain a new loan. Therefore, we do not know what
happens between two subsequent loans (8 months on average). Moreover, if a borrower
has not migrated by the last year of the study (2014), we have no way of knowing if
they plan to do so in the future. Finally, we are exposed to an attrition problem given
that some entrepreneurs stop securing new loans before the end of the study (2014) and
therefore disappear from the database. Table A3 documents that among firms created in
2008, only 38% (431 to 1,125) obtained a loan in 2014. We discuss these major drawbacks
in the sensitivity analysis in Section 4.
3.2 Variables
3.2.1 How to detect movers and stayers?
We aim at assessing the determinants of migration from one business sector to another.
We therefore need to distinguish between entrepreneurs who stay in their initial sector
(stayers) and entrepreneurs who shut down their initial business and launch a new one
in a different sector (movers).
Our database is composed of entrepreneurs who have obtained at least two loans from
the MFI. The great majority of loans granted by the MFI last one year. However, en-
trepreneurs can reimburse quicker, so that there is not necessarily one year between two
loans. To obtain a loan, the entrepreneur has to report to the MFI in which sector he
runs his business and how he plans to use the financing (mainly working capital or in-
vestment). It is worth noting that the MFI grant a new loan only to entrepreneurs who
did not face difficulties to reimburse the previous one. The MFI considers 38 different
business sectors (firms in our database operate in 27 of these sectors). After a discussion
with the MFI staff, we regrouped these into 14 homogenous sectors as some activities
are virtually indistinguishable to us.9 Table A1 presents the different sectors and the
9For instance, one business involves the transformation of rice and another involves the transformation
of food products. Considering these two activities as different might involve false migrations.
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number of firms in each sector. The majority of borrowers were operating in four sectors
(specialized trade, market gardening, general trade and other services) on the date of the
initial creation of their enterprise.
Based on this new classification of business sectors, we distinguish between ”movers” and
”stayers”. As illustrated by Figure 1, the entrepreneur has the opportunity of changing
activity sector between each loan he obtains. We define an entrepreneur as a ”mover” if
he reported to the MFI, when he obtained a subsequent loan, a different sector than the
one reported for the first loan. It correspond to what happens after step 3 and before
the final step on the Figure 1. The last loan we observe is either a loan obtained in
2014 (which is the end of our study period) or a loan obtained before but not renewed
by the entrepreneur afterward (due to lower financing needs or refusal from the MFI).
One of the difficulty in our study is to be sure that we observe a real sector change
and not the simultaneous creation of another activity, with a diversification purpose for
instance. To control for this aspect, we distinguish in our econometric analysis ”portfolio
entrepreneurs” who run simultaneously several activities and use additional restriction as
robustness checks.
3.2.2 How to measure financial constraint?
A critical step of our analysis consists in defining a good measure of financial constraint.
Financial constraint can be defined as the gap (due to lack of financing) between the
expected investment I˜i and investment capacity Ai for individual i. Insofar as the ex-
pected level of investment cannot be observed, the literature employs proxies of financial
constraints. The agent’s level of wealth has been generally used to assess financial con-
straints (see: Kerr and Nanda, 2011). Wealth has the advantage of being correlated to
assets invested in the business as well as to one’s borrowing capacity.10 Unfortunately,
we do not information on the individuals’ wealth level in our database.
10However, wealth may be subject to endogeneity (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004) and authors employing
agent’s wealth implicity assume that the level of expected investment do not differ across individuals.
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However, we observe the first loan amount secured from the partner MFI. We assume
this is a good proxy of the entrepreneur’s wealth when he launched his enterprise and
therefore a good proxy of his financial constraint for two reasons.
First, we believe that the relationship between the entrepreneur’s wealth and his borrow-
ing capacity is positive. Indeed, due to information asymmetry, a lender is particularly
reluctant to provide an unknown borrower a large amount of funds for an initial loan
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Consequently, a borrower has to provide reliable proof of
their repayment capacity, particularly via easily seizable collateral such as frozen savings,
to obtain a large loan. In other words, the larger the first loan obtained, the wealthier
the entrepreneur.
Second, we assume that entrepreneurs always ask for the maximum external financing
they need and receive the maximum they can handle (from the lender’s point of view).
Indeed, we could imagine that because external financing is costly, wealthy individuals
choose to resort to external lenders marginally in order to decrease their financing costs
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). Nonetheless, we believe that because of transaction costs like
application fees, time needed to complete application form, regular meetings at the MFI
agency to make monthly payments etc., it is in the entrepreneur’s interest to apply for a
large loan in order to amortize these fixed costs. Moreover, given that the absolute size
of the profit is positively proportional to the amount of sales, it is in the entrepreneur
interest to start the largest enterprise he can and therefore to ask for the maximum loan
they can handle. Due to the magnitude of the financial constraint in developing countries,
particularly for MSEs (Beck et al., 2005), this assumption seems quite acceptable to us.
For all of these reasons, we believe that the proportionality coefficient between an en-
trepreneur’s wealth and the first loan obtained is more or less the same for all the levels of
wealth. In other words, the smaller the first loan obtained, the smaller the entrepreneur’s
wealth and therefore the higher probability for him of having been financially constrained
when he started his business.
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Nonetheless, the entrepreneur could have obtained financing from informal lenders, kin or
moneylenders. In this case, we could imagine that a poor individual obtained a significant
amount of money allowing him to launch his enterprise in the desired sector, and obtained
a first small loan from the MFI one or two years later. In this case, the first credit
secured from the MFI would be a good measure of the entrepreneur’s initial wealth
but not of his financial constraint. We believe that the possibility of a business owner
obtaining significant financing from relatives is very unlikely because the wealth of the
entrepreneur’s kin is likely highly correlated with his own wealth. In other words, poor
people tend to have poor relatives. Therefore, poor people have a limited borrowing
capacity from their kin and still a higher probability of being financially constrained than
wealthy people.
Concerning moneylenders, loans they offer have high fees and short terms, two charac-
teristics which make these loans very unsuitable for launching a business. Moreover, we
interviewed 242 clients of our partner MFI and less than ten percent of clients used a
loan from relatives or money lenders as an additional source of financing.11
3.3 Methodology
To investigate whether financial constraint impact migration across sectors, we regress the
decision of entrepreneurs to change sectors based on the level of their financial constraint
and on additional control variables. Our baseline model is the following probit regression:
Pr(Yi = 1) = Φ(α + βBi + ΓXi) (1)
where subscript i refers to firm, Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution, Yi is
a dummy equals to 1 if a firm created between 2008 and 2010 has changed sector and 0
otherwise, Bi is first loan obtained by i (proxy of financial constraints) and Xi is a set of
11In September 2014 we conducted a small field survey among clients of the last quartile of the MFI’s
portfolio in Antananarivo. The bulk of the data has been used for another study, but some of the
information is still relevant for this article.
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control variables (discussed below). According to our framework, the initial level of finan-
cial constraint should affect the likelihood to migrate across business sectors. If the most
financial constraint entrepreneur are more willing to change sectors because they cannot
invest the right level of capital, we expect that β < 0. In other words, entrepreneurs hav-
ing larger loans have a lower probability to change sector. At the opposite, if migration
costs are the main obstacle to migration, we expect that β > 0. Only the less constrained
entrepreneurs are able to migrate to reach new opportunities.
A major pitfall concerns endogeneity. Unobserved individual’s characteristics can influ-
ence both his will to change sector and credit access. To take into account this endogene-
ity issue, we run an instrumental model along with the simple probit model. We employ
two instruments. The first instrument is the average annual loan amount granted by the
credit officer who accepts to finance the project. We expect that the average loan amount
granted by the same credit officer in a given year is highly correlated with the amount
of the individual’s first loan (obtained the same year from the same officer). Concerning
instrument’s relevance, by construction and because of credit officer’s character (like his
risk aversion or his years of experience for instance), individual’s first loan and loans aver-
age granting by the same officer are correlated. Concerning the exclusion condition, this
instrument is driven by supply-side factors and is therefore less subject to endogeneity is-
sues that could arise from demand-side factors. Indeed, endogeneity sources due to clients
localized in a same area, and who then could be affected by a shock inducing them to
ask a small loan and to change sector, can be tempered given that credit officers’ activity
does not seem limited to a specific localization. As illustrated in Table A4, credit officers
have a quite vast activity area. The median distance with their clients is 2 kilometers and
the standard deviation is 6.2 kilometers. In Table A5 we can see that on average, credit
officers seek out for clients on a 42,5 Km2 area, that is half of the Antananarivo area (88
Km2). These two tables illustrate that credit officers are in relation with entrepreneurs
who are quite dispersed and therefore are unlikely to have a similar propensity to change
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sector and ask for a small loan because of a common shock12.
The second instrument is the average loan amount granted to firms operating in the same
sector during the same year. This variable is positively correlated with the individual’s
first loan amount because this instrument captures determinants of the loan size that
are not related to the entrepreneur’s characteristics. One might raise concerns about the
exogeneity of this instrument if external shocks have impacted some sectors and not other
sectors. However, Figure A1 in Appendix documents that we cannot clearly observe a
trend from or to one sector. In addition, to ensure that our results are not driven by this
instrument, we re-run instrumental variables method excluding the second instrument.
In all models, we add variables to control for individual characteristics such as the en-
trepreneur’s gender and age. For instance, women or older borrowers may be more risk
adverse while younger entrepreneurs may consider changing sectors more easily since they
know they have a longer period to work. We also control for MSE characteristics by con-
sidering the firm size (number of employees) and the firm age when the first loan was
obtained. Indeed, the size of the enterprise and the loan amount may be correlated: en-
trepreneurs who take out a small first loan may tend to migrate because the small size of
their enterprise makes migration easier and not because they were financially constrained
when they invested. Given that the longer the period between the firm creation and the
first credit granting, the higher the likelihood that the entrepreneur changed sector before
he secure the credit from the MFI, and therefore the lower the probability of observing
sector change, it is necessary to control for the enterprise age.
We also try to control for unobservable characteristics such as entrepreneurial talent.
Very talented entrepreneurs may have a better perception of profit opportunities and
therefore a higher probability of changing sectors when an opportunity arises. At the
same time, they may also be more productive and therefore need smaller external financ-
12These computations are based on 1,925 clients of the database localized by the MFI.
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ing amounts, or they may more effectively convey their credit worthiness to lenders and
thus obtain larger loan amounts. Thus, entrepreneurial talent and financial constraint
appear to be correlated although the relationship between the two is unclear. We include
three dummies to control for firms that outperform their counterparts who took out a
loan and launched their business in the same year and in the same industry. We divide
firms in each industry by quartile according to their level of profit in the year of creation
and as controls we add dummies for firms in the second, third and fourth quartiles.13 We
believe that the initial performance of the firm gives us a good albeit imperfect proxy
of entrepreneurial talent. Finally, one might expect that push factors (i.e., all exogenous
shocks that can influence growth prospects in a sector, such as taxation, regulations,
new competitors on the market, etc.) at the industry level can be important drivers of
migration. We therefore include industry dummies to control for these aspects.
Finally, we add two additional variables to control for limits of our dependent variable.
Detecting movers and stayers is not as simple as one might expect. On the one hand,
some entrepreneurs launch activities simultaneously in different sectors, generally in or-
der to diversify their sources of income. These are called ”portfolio entrepreneurs”. For
instance, Paulson and Townsend (2004) document that 18% of households in Thailand
have more than one business. Unfortunately, our dependent variable gives us no informa-
tion on ”portfolio entrepreneurs”. To control for this issue, we create a dummy variable
(portfolio) that takes the value of 1 if the firm operated in a third sector that is different
from the initial and final sectors between its date of creation and 2014. Indeed, we might
assume that persons who obtained loans for three different businesses in six years are
in fact portfolio entrepreneurs who simultaneously created several businesses rather than
entrepreneurs who subsequently ”migrated” from one sector to another. The ”portfolio”
variable also takes the value of 1 if we observe that the entrepreneur started their business
in sector A, invested in sector B, and then reinvested in sector A. We assume that this
13Using dummies instead of values of profit allows us to control for outliers.
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”back and forth” between two sectors indicates that the entrepreneur invested simultane-
ously, and not subsequently, in two sectors. It is important to distinguish these two types
of entrepreneurs because we believe that they have different motivations (diversification
for the ”portfolio entrepreneur”) and therefore different implications in terms of contribu-
tion to economic growth. On the other hand, we control for the number of years between
the first observation (i.e. when the entrepreneurs obtained their first loan) and the final
observation (i.e. when they obtained their last loan). This aspect is also very important
because the shorter the period of observation, the lesser the probability of observing a
migration. For instance, if a firm was created in 2008 and obtained its first loan in 2013,
we have only two years of observation. If the entrepreneur did not change sectors, this
may be due to the fact that they plan to do so later (therefore we will not be able to
observe it) or because they did so before 2013 (again, we will not be able to observe this).
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Before investigating in detail the determinants of migration, we provide some simple
statistics. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. We observe that 30.5% of firms
created in 2008, 2009 or 2010 did not operate in the same sectors in 2014 (921 to 3,017)
as they had initially. Regarding our variable of interest, the average loan is around 600
US dollars but dispersion is wide.
We implement different t-tests to study whether movers and stayers differ. Results are
reported in Table 2. Movers and stayers are broadly similar in their characteristics.
When they obtain their first loan, their enterprises are the same size, in terms of number
of employees, sales and in fixed assets. They also show similarities in terms of profitability
and capital intensity. However, movers and stayers differ in terms of credit conditions.
Movers have on average smaller loans that required smaller interest rates.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Migration 3,017 0.31 0.47 0 1
Initial Amountab 3,017 603.44 1,389 22.9 22,900
Period 3,017 1.87 1.22 0 6
Portfolio 3,017 0.07 0.26 0 1
Initial age (firm)b 3,017 2.33 1.40 0 6
Initial age (Ind)b 3,017 36.68 8.87 19 68
Gender 3,017 0.6 0.49 0 1
Initial size (# of employees)b 3,017 1.88 2.12 0 48
Benefice (quartile 2) 3,017 0.3c 0.46 0 1
Benefice (quartile 3) 3,017 0.22c 0.41 0 1
Benefice (quartile 4) 3,017 0.12c 0.32 0 1
a Monetary values are in constant USD, where 1 USD = 3,144 Ariary.
b By ”initial”, we mean ”at the time of the first loan”.
c These variables are dummy equal to one if firm belongs to the quartile mentioned. Their
are not equal to 0.25 because we computed these variables on the total sample and not
only on the sample we used for regressions.
In the following section, we look at the dynamics of migration. To provide comprehensive
statistics, we focus on the total number of migrations. Only four of our fourteen sectors
(specialized trade, other services, construction and transport) ended up with a positive
”net migration” as documented in Figure A1 in the Appendix.14
One might have expected that these ”sectorial migrations” resulted from a structural
transformation where entrepreneurs would leave low-productive and low capital-intensive
sectors for more ”modern sectors”. However, this is not the case. We are unable to
distinguish clearly ”push sectors” (that is, sectors entrepreneurs would tend to leave) and
”pull sectors” (that is, sectors entrepreneurs would tend to migrate towards) and therefore
unable to identify specific ”migration patterns”. On the contrary, it appears that every
sector experiences both departures and arrivals. For instance, the general trade and
specialized trade sectors account for a large share of ”emigrants” and ”immigrants” as
illustrated by Figure A1.15 Therefore, sectorial migration appears to be a very complex
14Net migration is positive if the dark bar (% of immigrants in the final sector compared to the number
of MSEs in the initial sector at the first observation) is higher than the bright bar (% of emigrants in
the initial sector).
15The same conclusions can be drawn if we consider these sector changes in relative number of firms
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Table 2: T-test of individual variables
Stayers Movers t-test
Individual characteristics at the time of the first loan
Age (enterprise) 2.49 1.96 9.54***
Age (entrepreneur) 35.67 35.94 0.77
Gender 0.6 0.62 -0.88
Firms characteristics at the time of the first loan
Employees 1.85 1.91 -0.72
Sales 1,333 1,208 0.89
Fixed assets 1,738 1,618 0.38
Net income 198.5 194 0.38
Profitability (net income/sales) 0.43 0.53 -0.72
Capital intensity (assets/employees) 917.5 1033 -0.84
Capital intensity (sales/assets) 21.8 21.4 0.72
Information concerning the first loan obtained
Amount of first loan 643 513 2.36***
Maturity 385.03 382.15 1.98**
Interest rate 19.98 19.57 7.17***
Collateral (amount) 2.036 1.688 1.55*
Collateral (% of loan amount) 3.11 3.17 -0.92
Monetary values are in constant USD, where 1 USD=3,144 Ariary. Absolute value of t-tests are reported.
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
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phenomenon, with no particular pattern, as illustrated by the Figure A2 in the Appendix:
all sectors gain/lose enterprises and ”emigrant/immigrant”enterprises can represent a very
large share of firms in any given sector.
4.2 Baseline model
The econometric results, of our baseline model are presented in Table 3. The first two
columns show the results with and without the measure of financial constraint (total
amount borrowed). In the last four columns we show results using instrumental variable
methods to control for endogeneity. We report both the linear (two-stage least square)
and non-linear model (IV-Probit) results.
When we do not control for endogeneity, the coefficient associated to the amount borrowed
is negative and statistically significant. This result indicates that the higher the financial
constraint, the higher the incentives to change business sectors. Increasing the level
of the amount borrowed by one-standard deviation decreases by two percentage points
the probability of migrating.16 This level seems relatively high insofar as one third of
firms created between 2008 and 2010 had migrated by 2014. Concerning other individual
control variables, we find a positive effect of number of periods. Quite logically, the longer
the observation period, the higher the likelihood of observing sector change for a MSE.
The age of the firm is also strongly significant. The older the enterprise when the first
loan is obtained, the lower the probability of changing sector. This result may suggest
that entrepreneurs changed sector before obtaining his first loan. Another explanation
is that the longer this period between the firm creation and the first loan, the smaller
the observation period. In addition, owners of large firms (in terms of employees) seem
more reluctant to migrate. However, this result is not always robust, especially when we
control for the total amount borrowed.
by sector.
16Marginal effects in the Table 3 are reported for financial figures in 1,000 USD. The economic effect
of a one-standard deviation is obtained as follows: βˆ × Std Dev. = −0.014 × 1.396 = 0.0194
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These baseline results illustrate to what degree financial constraint may influence the de-
cision for an entrepreneur to change business sectors. According to the theoretical frame-
work (see Section 2), they would indicate that there are ”constrained entrepreneurs”, i.e.,
people who did not secure enough financing to invest in the sector they initially targeted.
As a result, they changed sectors as soon as they as they are financially able.
As discussed in Section 3, a major pitfall in our approach concerns endogeneity issues.
We employ two instruments. First, the average annual loan amount granted by the credit
officer who serves the entrepreneur. We believe that the average loan amount granted by
the credit officer in a given year is highly correlated with the size of the entrepreneur’s
first loan, due to officer characteristics (for instance, strong risk aversion). The second in-
strument is the average loan amount granted to firms operating in the same sector during
the same year. This variable is positively correlated with the amount of the individual’s
first loan and not correlated with the decision of changing sector because this instrument
captures determinants of the loan size that are not related to the entrepreneur’s charac-
teristics.
We report the results of the linear two-stage least squares and instrumental probit, in
columns [3] to [6]. We run different specifications. Columns [3] and [4] include the
two instruments discussed above. According to the usual tests, the instruments are
both strong (F-value) and exogenous (overidentification test). The coefficients associated
to the interest variable remain statistically and economically significant in both linear
(column 3) and non-linear specifications (column 4). The fifth and sixth column include
exclusively the average loan amount granted by the same MFI branch. Indeed, one
might expect that the second instrument (average loan offered to firms operating in
the same sector during the same year) could be endogeneous. A shock in a sector in
2008 (such as an increase in input price or a new regulation) might affect the future
profits of firms operating in this sector. In this case, the microfinance institution may
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Table 3: Probit estimations: Baseline results
Probit Instrumentation
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Probit Probit 2SLS IV-Probit 2SLS IV-Probit
First credit Amount -0.014*** -0.016** -0.061** -0.016** -0.061**
(-2.94) (-2.24) (-2.19) (2.15) (-2.10)
Period 0.0334*** 0.0333*** 0.0362*** 0.1045*** 0.0362*** 0.1045***
(4.37) (4.31) (3.92) (4.34) (3.92) (4.34)
Portfolio 0.0822* 0.0839* 0.0985* 0.2675* 0.0985* 0.2673*
(1.80) (1.77) (1.93) (1.79) (1.93) (1.79)
Age (firm)a -0.0334*** -0.0329*** -0.0327*** -0.1028*** -0.0327*** -0.1029***
(-4.28) (-4.15) (-3.99) (-4.04) (-3.99) (-4.05)
Age (ind.)a 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0007 0.0003 0.0007
(0.23) (0.24) (0.32) (0.23) (0.32) (0.23)
Gender 0.0030 0.0038 0.0047 0.0131 0.0046 0.0132
(0.20) (0.26) (0.32) (0.28) (0.32) (0.28)
Size (# of employees)a -0.0083** -0.0058 -0.0047 -0.0151 -0.0047 -0.0151
(-2.13) (-1.42) (-1.25) (-1.24) (-1.26) (-1.25)
Benefice (quartile 2) 0.0074 0.0087 0.0095 0.0289 0.0095 0.0289
(0.36) (0.43) (0.48) (0.46) (0.48) (0.46)
Benefice (quartile 3) 0.0017 0.0062 0.0069 0.0250 0.0068 0.0249
(0.09) (0.34) (0.37) (0.43) (0.37) (0.43)
Benefice (quartile 4) 0.0018 0.0191 0.0256 0.0858 0.0255 0.0852
(-0.06) (0.55) (0.71) (0.75) (0.71) (0.75)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs 3,017 3,017 3,017 3,017
Pseudo R2 0.0855 0.0863 0.1053 0.1055
Test for IV
- Exogeneity 0.2452 0.3133 0.2517 0.3561
- Overidentification 0.8607
F value of excluded instruments 4912.5 9747.46
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a firm has changed sector between its year of creation (2008, 2009 or 2010) and 2014.
Probit specification is used in column [1] and [2], 2SLS in columns [3] and [5] and IV-probit in columns [4] and [6]. The set of instruments
is the average loan amount granted by a same MFI’s credit officer during the same year and the average loan offered for firms operated in
the same sector in the same year (the second instrument is excluded in columns [5] and [6]). Marginal effects are reported (marginal effects
for loan amount are reported for 1,000 USD). Standard errors are clustered at the industry-level and industry-dummies are included. *,
**, *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
a Measured when the entrepreneur obtains his first credit from the MFI
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be reluctant to provide a large loan and the entrepreneur may have an incentive to leave
this sector. We do not believe that this issue is a real problem insofar as we control
for industry shocks (dummies). Nonetheless, to be sure, we rerun our instrumentation
excluding this instrument. As presented in columns [5] and [6], our results are not affected
by excluding this instrument. Finally, the different instrumental specifications tend to
reject the presence of endogeneity according to Wu-Hausman tests (linear models) and
Wald tests of exogeneity (IV-probit models). In different specifications, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis posing that instrumented and non-instrumented regressions provide
statistically the same results. We, therefore, run additional robustness checks without
taking into consideration the endogeneity issue.
4.3 Robustness checks
Our baseline results document that the smaller the financial constraint at the time the
entrepreneur created their business, the smaller the likelihood of them changing sectors
thereafter. We run a battery of sensitivity tests to gauge the validity of our baseline
results. Results are reported in Table 4.
First, results can be driven by the model specification. We therefore employ a linear
model (column [1]) and a logit model (column [2]), which does not alter our results. In
addition, we withdraw all control variables (column [3]). Again, the results are quite
similar.
We consider the initial amount borrowed as a good proxy for the degree of the en-
trepreneur’s financial constraint based on the assumption that his personal income level
and ability to secure external financing are positively correlated. In other words, the
larger the entrepreneur’s first loan, the wealthier we can assume that the entrepreneur
was, and therefore the lower his level of financial constraint when he launched his busi-
ness. This assumption seems quite straightforward given that a potential borrower has
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to pledge a significant amount of collateral in order to secure a loan, even from an MFI.
However, our hypothesis becomes more questionable as the time between the first credit
year and the firm’s starting year increases (see Table A3 in the Appendix). First, the en-
trepreneur may be unable to afford a substantial loan at the time they start their business
and therefore not try and take out an initial small loan, but rather wait a few years to
accumulate savings in order to obtain a bigger loan once their finances have become more
stable. In this case, the borrower’s first loan would be larger and not reflect financial con-
straint the entrepreneur faced when he launched his business. Secondly, the entrepreneur
may not need external financing to launch his business. However, the business may sub-
sequently decline and the entrepreneur may ultimately need to obtain a small loan. In
this case, the business owners obtaining a first small loan would not necessarily indicate
that they were financially constrained when their business was created. We face similar
endogeneity issues if an entrepreneur started their business by resorting to a lender other
than our partner MFI. To control for this aspect, in addition to employing instrumental
variables, we created a sub-sample composed of entrepreneurs who obtained their first
loan the same year they launched their business. Results, reported in column [4], are not
affected by this change. We can even notice that the economic effect is stronger.
In addition, the impact of financial constraints should be higher for opaque firms with
limited access to finance. We provide a test based on the age of the owner to confirm
our hypothesis. An older business owner may have already developed a firm in the past
or may have already contacted a microfinance institution to get a loan. By contrast, a
younger business owner may face more financial constraints since they have had less time
to accumulate their own capital. We distinguish between firms whose owner is ”young”
(below the median age of 35) and firms with older owners (above the median age). Em-
pirical results tend to support our hypothesis (columns [5] and [6]). The effect of financial
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Table 4: Robustness checks
Specification 1st year
[1] [2] [3] [4]
First credit Amount -0.058** -0.035** -0.046*** -0.094***
(-2.40) (-2.27) (-2.80) (-2.73)
Controls Yes Yes No Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 3,017 3,017 3,017 337
Pseudo R2 0.100 0.135 0.110 0.090
Age of the individual Portfolio Cohort 2008
[5] [6] [7] [8]
First credit Amount -0.017*** -0.009 -0.013* -0.058**
(-3.49) (-1.23) (-1.74) (-2.32)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs. 1,504 1,513 2,278 1125
Pseudo R2 0.0896 0.0959 0.238 0.086
Column [1] illustrates results with a linear model, column [2] with a logit model, column
[3] without control variables, column [4] only for firms who obtained their first credit
the year they have been created, column [5] for individuals below the median age of 35
and column [6] for individuals above this age, column [7] for a sample without portfolio
entrepreneurs and people likely to be it, column [8] for firms created in 2008 only.
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a firm has migrated between its
year of creation (2008, 2009 or 2010) and 2014 for columns [1] to [8]. All models are
estimated using a probit specification with the exception of columns [1] (OLS) and [2]
(logit). Marginal effects for loan amount are reported for 1,000 USD. Standard errors
are clustered at the industry-level and industry-dummies are included. Control variables
include the following list of variables: period, previous change, portfolio, entrepreneur’s
age at the time of the first credt, gender, firm’s age at the time of the first credt, size
and profit (Q2, Q3 and Q4). *, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
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constraint matters only for the sub-sample of young entrepreneurs.17
One might argue that what we observe is the creation of a second enterprise by the same
entrepreneur (or by someone else, with whom the entrepreneur is simply obtaining the
loan) rather than a real move across sectors of a given enterprise. If this were the case,
the interpretation of our results would be completely different. It is possible that finan-
cial constraints could increase a business owner’s likelihood of developing activities in
multiple sectors. In our baseline model, we try to provide a simple control for this pos-
sibility by including the portfolio variable (see above). Below, we present an additional
test to be sure that we observe real moves across sectors rather than business diversifi-
cation. Disentangling ”real movers” to ”portfolio entrepreneurs” is not simple with our
data as for each loan request the borrower declares only one business sector, even if he
exercises multiple businesses. Nonetheless, we expect that a real mover would report the
new sector as their business in all future loan requests, whereas we expect a ”portfolio
entrepreneur” would report both their previous and new sector sequentially. Based on
this assumption, we drop firms that have a final sector that differs from the second-to-last
sector. We therefore focus our attention on firms that applied for a loan for a business
in a new sector for at least two consecutive years.18 Our sample is thus reduced (2,278
observations instead of 3,017). While this is an imperfect test, we do exclude a large
share of portfolio entrepreneurs. Our results, reported in column [7], point out that our
conclusions are not altered.
Furthermore, to be sure that our findings are not driven by a specific sector, we exclude
each sector of origin and run the baseline model. Results, unreported but available upon
request, remain statistically and economically similar.
17Our results are unchanged if we use the first quartile age of 29 as threshold.
18For instance, suppose that we have four observations for a firm operating in sector A. This firm is
declared as a stayer if its sequence of sectors is as follows: (A, A, A, A); the firm is declared as a mover
if its sequence is (A, A, B, B) or (A, B, B, B); finally the firm is excluded if the sequence is (A, A, A, B)
because we cannot be sure that it is a real mover or a portfolio entrepreneur and if the sequence is (A,
B, A, B) because this clearly indicates a portfolio entrepreneur.
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An additional potential weakness of our econometric strategy concerns the choice of a
cohort of firms created between 2008 and 2010. We believe that using these firms allows
us to compare a sufficient number of firms which face the same business environment.
However, our results may be driven by the specific year of the cohort. To test the
sensitivity of our results, we consider firms created in 2008.19 For the subsample of firms
created in 2008, we rerun our baseline model as well as instrumentation and the battery of
sensitivity tests presented above. Our results are strongly robust insofar as the coefficient
associated to financial constraint is always negative and statistically significant at the
usual threshold (columns [8]).
A final concern of our econometric strategy is the risk of attrition bias given that certain
firms disappear from the database and we are not able to know if they subsequently
changed sectors or not. Indeed, for 52% of the firms (1,599 out of 3,017) we have no
information for 2014, which means that these entrepreneurs stopped securing loans from
our partner MFI, either because they did not seek additional financing or because the
MFI refused to grant them another loan. Attrition bias may arise if the borrowers’ non-
renewal is caused by their level of financial constraint. For instance, highly financially
constrained entrepreneurs may want to change sectors but face more difficulty repaying
their loan and thus may be unable to afford or obtain a new loan. Conversely, non-
financially constrained individuals may no longer need external financing and may seize
an opportunity in another sector. We propose several tests to control for the possibility
that the financial constraint influences the probability that an entrepreneur does not ob-
tain a new loan. We create a dummy equal to one if data about a firm is available for
2014 and 0 otherwise. We regress the likelihood of observing information in 2014 to the
borrower’s financial constraint and all control variables. Results are reported in Table
5. The coefficient associated with the initial loan amount is not statistically different
19Due to the limited period of time, we cannot consider firms created after 2011 as an additional
robustness test.
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Table 5: Robustness checks - Attrition
Attrition
[1] [2] [3] [4]
First credit Amount -0.007 0.003 0.096 -0.009
(-0.75) (0.07) (0.53) (-0.98)
First credit Amount2 -0.0009
(-1.08)
Period 0.1486*** 1.1036*** 0.2633*** 0.2584***
(33.06) (41.65) (38.96) (34.07)
Portfolio -0.0472 -0.2298 -0.0686** -0.0374
(-1.61) (-1.55) (-2.39) (-0.74)
Age (firm)a 0.2397*** 1.0446*** 0.2397*** 0.2519***
(108.95) (65.51) (61.96) (64.89)
Age (ind)a 0.0002 0.0011 0.0008 -0.0002
(0.27) (0.43) (0.55) (-0.33)
Gender -0.0151 -0.0631 -0.0170 -0.0163
(-0.85) (-0.81) (-0.96) (-0.72)
Size (# of employees)a -0.0482** -0.0281** -0.0278*** -0.0088
(-2.11) (-1.98) (-3.06) (-1.39)
Benefice (quartile 2) 0.0503 0.0250 0.0276** -0.0067
(0.93) (0.85) (2.31) (-0.17)
Benefice (quartile 3) 0.1977*** 0.0630** 0.0606* 0.0301
(3.14) (2.56) (1.96) (0.84)
Benefice (quartile 4) 0.1698** -0.0341 -0.0280 0.0322
(2.02) (1.46) (-0.46) (0.67)
Industry-dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 3,017 3,226 1,454 1,563
Pseudo R2 0.3838 0.4044 0.4085 0.368
F-test (joint test) 0.07
Column [1] represents the likelihood of observing information in 2014 regressed on the bor-
roweraˆA˘Z´s financial constraint and all control variables, column [2] represents a quadratic
specification to capture a U-shaped relationship between financial constraint and likeli-
hood to exit the database, column [3] illustrates results on a sub-sample of firms whose
the financial constraint is below the median value, and column [4] above the median value.
The dependent variable is a dummy equals to one if data for firms is available in 2014 and
0 otherwise for columns. All models are estimated using a probit specification with the
exception of column [2] (OLS). Marginal effects for loan amount are reported for 1,000
USD. F-test in column [2] is a test of joint significance of amount and amounts squared.
Standard errors are clustered at the industry-level and industry-dummies are included.
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
a Measured when the entrepreneur obtains his first credit from the MFI
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from 0 (column [1]), suggesting that a borrower’s exit from the database does not depend
upon the magnitude of their financial constraint. However, we face two different types
of attrition from the database, i.e. failure and growth of the enterprise. In this case,
we expect that the probability of exiting the database is positively related to financial
constraint for the most constrained firms and negatively for the least constrained firms.
We therefore use a quadratic specification to capture a U-shaped relationship between
financial constraint and likelihood to exit the database (column [2]).20 We also divide our
sample in two sub-samples according to the median value of financial constraint (columns
[3] and [4]). Our main results are unchanged in these different models. The level of fi-
nancial constraint never explain a firm’s withdrawal from the database.
4.4 ”Low-High” and ”High-Low” movers
We argue that some entrepreneurs may prefer to invest in a sector requiring a higher
initial investment but cannot do so due to their inability to obtain a sufficient amount of
capital. Rather than fail or merely survive in their preferred sector, they may launch a
business in a different sector with the intent of earning enough money to change sectors
later. According to our hypothesis, as soon as they have accumulated enough money to
invest the minimum amount required, these entrepreneurs migrate towards sectors re-
quiring higher levels of entry costs.
To provide additional evidence, we classify sectors according to entry costs. It is worth
noting that entry costs are complex and difficult for us to calculate. We therefore provide
only an approximation of entry costs by reporting the level of median total assets21 of
MSEs that obtained their credit the year they were created (during 2008-2014, nb. obs.
20We use a linear model because we cannot directly infer the results by scrutinizing the signs of
coefficients in a non-linear model (Greene, 2010). However, we also employ a probit model which does
not alter our results.
21Total assets are defined as the sum of fixed assets and working capital
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732), which gives us an initial idea of how much financing an entrepreneur must invest
to run a business in a given sector. We can observe a significant level of heterogeneity
across business sectors. For instance, as illustrated in Figure A3 and Table A2 in the
Appendix, renting, collection and transport sectors require nine times more assets than
the catering, hairdressing and food processing sectors.
After ranking sectors according to the median amount of fixed assets, we study the pattern
of migration across sectors. On the 921 movers, we observe that 456 (49.5%) migrated
toward a higher entry cost sector (Low-High movers) while 465 (50.5%) did the opposite
and migrated toward a lower entry cost sector (High-Low movers).
However, our conceptual framework explains only Low-High mover behaviors. Indeed,
given that High-Low movers invest in a second sector with lower entry costs than the first
one, we cannot assume that they were were financially prevented from doing so since the
beginning given that the second sector requires a lower first investment. There are other
reasons that can explain sector changes from a lower to a higher entry cost sector.22 Of
course, all of these reasons are important for explaining sector changes. For instance, if
financially constrained entrepreneurs initially decide to reach their ”first choice sector”
ultimately, it is with the expectation of generating higher profits. However, we believe
that their current profit is lower than expected because of the financial constraint, and
not because of any type of ”entry mistakes”. As only Low-High movers are likely to have
been financially constrained when they started their business, we expect that the initial
amount of credit can explain only their decisions, and not those of the High-Low movers.
Firstly, we can compare the average first loan between Low-High movers and stayers.
22For instance, entrepreneurs may be serial-entrepreneurs who are constantly looking for new profit
opportunities and launch businesses successively if the profit of the business they currently practice is
below a certain threshold (Plehn-Dujowich, 2010). The decision to change sectors can also result from
”entry mistakes” because the entrepreneur underestimates competition (Cabral, 1997), overestimates the
average profit in the sector (Bennett, 2010) or was simply ”overconfident” in his capacity to perform
(Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). Finally, sectoral changes can also be driven by individual characteristics,
such as boredom.
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According to our conceptual framework, Low-High movers wanted to invest in a sector
whose entry costs exceeded their initial investment capacity. Logically, we expect that
their initial loan amount will be smaller than the initial average loan amount in the sector
they initially wanted to invest in (that is, the sector where they launched their second
business). Column [1] of Table 6 shows the average initial loan amount by sector (for
all the sample) and column [3] for ”stayers” only (i.e. entrepreneurs who did not change
sectors). Column [2] indicates the average initial loan amount for Low-High movers.
For instance, we can see that Low-High movers who create their second business in the
collection sector obtained a loan on average 2.3 times smaller than ”native entrepreneurs”
(i.e. people who directly invested in the collection sector) and 3 times smaller if we
compare to ”stayers” only in column [4]. We can make a similar analysis for 11 out of 12
sectors.
As an additional test, we expect that financial constraint should be significant only for
the Low-High movers and not for High-Low movers. In Table 7, we regress the probability
for an entrepreneur to be a High-Low mover (column [1]), or to be a mover (column [2]),
on the level of financial constraint and usual control variables. As expected, the first
credit amount is significant only for Low-High movers23. These results tend to support
our hypothesis that some of the sectoral changes we observe, especially those from lower
to higher entry cost sectors, may be due to entrepreneur initially prevented from investing
in their first choice sector because of financial constraint.
5 Conclusion
Using an original database of over 3,000 micro and small enterprises (MSEs) that were
microfinance institution (MFI) clients in Madagascar over the period of 2008-2014, we
observe that around one third of these entrepreneurs changed business sectors in the
23Our result are not altered if we consider as entry costs measures the first quartile or the fifth centile
of total assets by sector.
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Table 6: ”Low-High” and ”High-Low” entrepreneurs
Average first loan of Low-High compared to
average first loan of the total sample, by
sector
Average first loan of Low-High compared to
average first loan of ”stayers”, by sector
Total sample Low-High Stayers Low-High
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Hairdressing 294 NAa 281 NAa
Collection 1 023 440* 1 325 440**
(1,95) (2,44)
Specialized trade 468 288 493 288
(1,43) (1,50)
Construction 420 393 339 393
(0,33) (-0,70)
General trade 507 333* 522 333
(1,71) (1,56)
Other services 616 374** 547 374**
(2,34) (2,26)
Farming 291 268 289 268
(0,35) (0,31)
Medium size manufacturing 372 198 293 198
(0,37) (0,82)
Catering 366 221 525 221
(0,96) (1,49)
Renting 416 539* 436 539
(-1,90) (-1,25)
Small size manufacturing 262 227 293 227
(0,53) (0,82)
Liberal professions 2 701 926 8 001 926**
(0,98) (2,41)
Food processing 465 NAa 633 NAa
Transport 1 600 1 064 1 658 1 064
(1,41) (1,44)
t-student are in brackets.*, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. Figures are expressed in US dollars.
a Because the hairdressing and food processing sectors have very low entry cots, they have not ”received” Low-High entrepreneurs, i.e. people
who left sectors with lower entry costs.
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Table 7: ”Low-High” and ”High-Low” entrepreneurs
Low-High entrepreneurs High-Low entrepreneurs
[1] [2]
First credit Amount -0.027*** -0,002
(-2.92) (-0.38)
Period 0.0134** 0.0188***
(2.13) (2.97)
Portfolio 0.0384 0.0606*
(1.58) (2.56)
Age (firm)a -0.0171*** -0.0165***
(-3.08) (-2.92)
Age (ind.)a 0.0005 0.0007
(0.72) (1.00)
Gender 0.0106 -0.008
(0.79) (-0.60)
Size (# of employees)a 0.0053 0.0017
(1.64) (0.50)
Profit (quartile 2) 0.0204 -0.0175
(1.29) (-1.09)
Profit (quartile 3) 0.0205 -0.0088
(1.14) (-0.49)
Profit (quartile 4) 0.0388 -0.0172
(1.57) (-0.70)
# Obs 3017 3017
Pseudo R2 0.0217 0.0245
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if an entrepreneur has invested in a sec-
tor with higher entry costs than his first one (for the column ”Low-High entrepreneurs”)
or in in a sector with higher entry costs than his first one (for the column ”High-Low
entrepreneurs”). Marginal effects are reported (marginal effects for loan amount are re-
ported for 1,000 USD). *, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
a Measured when the entrepreneur obtains his first credit from the MFI.
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first five years after starting their business. While the literature would explain this phe-
nomenon by serial entrepreneurs driven by profit or by entry mistakes in a given sector,
we suggest another explanation. We find a significant negative relationship between the
size of the first loan secured from the MFI and the probability of a borrower changing
business sectors. This result survives multiple robustness checks, including treatment for
endogeneity and attrition. We interpret this result in terms of financial constraint that
prevent small entrepreneurs from investing in the sector they want. Because of limited
opportunities in the job market, these individuals are ”forced” to start their own busi-
nesses even in a second choice sector, and therefore change sectors as soon as they are
financially able. Literature on the relationship between entrepreneurship and financial
constraint is abundant, but to our knowledge, we are the first to document these ”sectorial
migrations” and to suggest that they may be due to financial constraint.
Our results shed light on the composition of entrepreneurship and challenge the classic
distinction made between ”necessity entrepreneurs” and ”opportunity entrepreneurs”. In-
deed, we believe that the financially constrained entrepreneurs we are studying can be
considered both as opportunity driven entrepreneurs, as they want to start an enterprise,
and as necessity entrepreneurs because they are ”forced” to invest in a second-choice sec-
tor (due to financial constraint and a lack of job opportunities) while they may have
preferred employment. Accordingly, necessity entrepreneurs may simply be reluctant to
work in a sector by default rather than reluctant to run a business per se. As already
suggested by Block and Sandner (2009), necessity entrepreneurs cannot be defined as sim-
ply lacking in business talent and could have as much growth potential as ”opportunity
driven” entrepreneurs if they were able to run the activity for which they are the most
motivated and therefore the most suited.
This observation raises interesting questions about the allocation of entrepreneurial tal-
ent. One third of entrepreneurs in our sample (921 out of 3,017) changed sectors and at
least half of them may have done so because they were financially constrained initially.
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Ensuring a good match between an individual’s aspirations and his activity endeavors
is a cornerstone of economic development. According to our theoretical framework, the
”sectorial migrations” we observe illustrate both an initial mismatch and a ”re-matching”
given that ”migrating entrepreneurs” ultimately reach the ”promised sector”. However, it
does not mean that every constrained entrepreneur ultimately manages to change sectors
or that this initial mismatch did not result in a loss of growth and happiness for the
entrepreneur. Therefore, reducing this mismatch is a valuable field of work for develop-
ment practitioner, especially those of the microfinance sector. Rapidly and accurately
identifying constrained entrepreneurs in order to reduce the time they take to reach their
first choice sector is an important goal. Credit officers could screen their clients in order
to identify potential ”migrating entrepreneurs” and adapt their financing to their specific
needs. For instance, Field et al. (2013) have documented that granting loans with longer
maturity terms, and even a grace period, could allow people to make longer-term invest-
ments. However, helping entrepreneurs to invest in the right sector from the beginning
could be better than allowing them to change sectors. It raises the question of start-up
financing which is one of the riskiest parts in business, but also when financial constraint
may have the most critical incidence given that it may induce people to invest in sector
that is inappropriate or unsuited to them. MFIs may want to develop specific method-
ology in order to avoid mismatching. For instance, they could implement an in-depth
screening-phase during which credit officers help the would-be entrepreneurs to make his
business plan and assess his ability to run a business. In a recent study, McKenzie (2015)
finds that business plan competition is an effective tool for identifying the most talented
entrepreneurs, and that winning firms (which received financial award) experience larger
growth rates in sales, profits and employment.
Of course, a complete answer to questions raised by these observations would require more
detailed information on entrepreneurs (especially their education, family background and
social aspirations) in order to tell with certainty what their first choice sector may have
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been. Much more work is also needed to understand more precisely how credit influences
the choice of the first activity and sector changes. Indeed, we consider the amount
borrowed as a proxy of financial constraint but are not able to identify its role in the
migration given that we have information only on entrepreneurs who obtained a loan.
Finally, observing whether sectorial migrations occur in other contexts (with different
constraints on the credit and job markets) is also a very interesting avenue for future
works.
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Appendix A Additional Tables and Figures
Table A1: Classification by sectors, subsectors and activities
Sectors, subsectors and activities
Sector Subsectors activities Nb. Obs. Share
Agricultural Farming
Small farming 14 0.5%
Market gardening 297 9.9%
Cattle farming 82 2.7%
Services
Hairdressing Hairdressing 50 1.7%
Collection* Collection 52 1.7%
Construction Construction 48 1.6%
Catering Catering 73 2.4%
Renting and fixing** Renting and fixing 136 4.5%
Liberal professions Liberal professions 28 0.9%
Transport Transport 284 9.4%
Other services
Other 245 8.1%
Cleaning 2 0.1
Trade
General Trade General Trade 308 10.2%
Specialized Trade Specialized Trade 1,091 36.2%
Manufacturing
Small manufacturing
Craft (art, painting, sculpture) 30 1.0%
Jewelery 12 0.4%
Medium manufacturing***
Equipment manufacturing 49 1.6%
Textile manufacturing 119 4.0%
Woodworking 30 1.0%
Food processing meal, milk, rice, grains, oil 67 2.2%
*”Collection” is a sector that consists of gathering the production of farmers in rural areas and bringing it to the
markets in cities.
**”Renting and repairs” is an activity consisting in fixing, and occasionally renting, vehicles, machinery and devices,
like electrical household appliances and small electronic devices.
***By specifying ”medium manufacturing”, we mean to make the distinction from small manufacturing without
implying that MSEs do ”heavy manufacturing” such as mining, industrial machinery or metal refining.
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Table A2: Entry costs accross sectorsa
Sectors 5th centile of total assetsb 25th centile of total assets 50th centile of total assets
Renting/fixing 1,064 1,825 3,041
Collection 942 999 2,602
Transport 196 1,090 2,166
Liberal professions 366 634 2,056
Other services 229 811 1,457
Construction 253 901 1,053
Small manufacturing 108 214 867
General trade 147 426 797
Farming 236 439 693
Specialized trade 166 292 630
Medium manufacturing 118 229 448
Catering 65 193 304
Hairdressing 54 166 295
Food processing 85 196 287
a Total assets is the sum of fixed assets and working capital. We consider as a measure of entry costs the average total assets
of new firms created in a specific sector. Figures are in US dollars.
b The total assets are the sum of fixed assets and working capital
Table A3: Sample breakdown according to the first and last credit year
MSE starting year
MSEs breakdown according to the year of the first credit obtained from the MFI
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
2008 161 155 152 252 243 155 7 1125
2009 103 132 328 274 228 20 1085
2010 91 243 282 180 11 807
MSE starting year
MSE breakdown according to the year of the last loan obtained from the MFI
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
2008 30 65 64 193 342 431 1125
2009 1 11 70 184 247 572 1085
2010 20 119 253 415 807
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Table A4: Distancea between MFI clients and their credit officer, by city
Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Nbr. of entrepreneurs
Mahajanga 2.1 2 1.5 0.2 132
Tsaramandroso 1.8 1.1 2.1 0.11 108
Antananarivo (1st arrondissement) 3.7 2.2 10.4 0.03 122
Antananarivo (4th arrondissement) 4.8 2.5 15.3 0.05 69
Ambohitrimanjaka 6.2 6.6 2.6 0.82 12
Antananarivo (6th arrondissement) 1.5 1.1 1.4 0.06 64
Ivato Ambohibao 5.8 3.6 10.5 0.14 73
Ambohimangakely 3.3 2.9 4.2 0.2 105
Ankadikely Ilafy 2.9 2.5 1.8 0.49 109
Tanjombato 5.5 2 13.3 0.15 74
Antananarivo (2th arrondissement) 5 2.1 21.6 0.19 96
Ambatolampy 3 0.9 13.1 0.01 86
Ambohimandroso 12.3 15.2 6.2 0.18 27
Soamalaza Mahatsinjo 6.7 2.1 17.7 0.13 408
Ambositra I 1.5 0.7 3 0.1 60
Tanana Ambany 6.6 1.7 20.9 0.12 191
Moramanga 1.9 1.9 0.6 1.47 2
All sample 3.7 2.1 6.2 0.14 1738
a Distances are in kilometers.
Table A5: Average and median surface of activity for credit officers, by city
Average surface
(Km2)
Average perimeter
(Km)
Mediane surface
(Km2)
Mediane perimeter
(Km)
Mahajanga 14.1 16.6 13.8 16.4
Tsaramandroso 22.7 21.1 14.6 17.1
Antananarivo (1st
arrondissement)
37.9 24.5 34.7 23.8
Antananarivo (4th
arrondissement)
58.3 34.7 32.1 27.7
Ambohitrimanjaka 42.2 35.4 42.2 35.4
Antananarivo (6th
arrondissement)
18.8 18.1 18.9 19.7
Ivato Ambohibao 131.9 55.1 131.9 55.1
Ambohimangakely 31.2 21.9 14.6 20.5
Ankadikely Ilafy 48.7 31.9 51.9 30.4
Tanjombato 25.8 20 32.3 26
Antananarivo (2th
arrondissement)
33.3 24.4 27.5 24.2
Ambatolampy 12.9 15.7 12.9 15.7
Ambohimandroso 75.4 43.7 75.4 43.7
Soamalaza
Mahatsinjo
65.4 47.1 53.8 37.8
Ambositra I 12.2 20.5 12.2 20.5
Tanana Ambany 41.8 31.7 21.3 19.3
All sample 42.5 30.3 31.3 25.5
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Figure A3: Total assets (fixed assets + working capital) median of MSEs that obtained
their credit the year they have been created (2008-2014), by sector, nb. obs. 732, in USD
48
